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EDITORIAL
The Spring European Council in Brussels 
last month reached two agreements that I 
believe will, if rigorously implemented, 
restore credibility to the functioning of the 
EU’s system of economic governance, 
safeguard the stability of our public finances 
and instil new dynamism into our efforts to 
boost Europe’s, and more specifically the 
euro area’s economic performance. Firstly, 
the Heads of State and Government 
endorsed a report on the Stability and 
Growth Pact by the Council of Ministers for 
Economic and Financial Affairs that paves 
the way for a new consensus on the 
importance of sound and stability-oriented 
budgetary policies. Secondly, they agreed to 
re-launch the EU’s economic reform agenda 
for growth and jobs without delay. I would 
like to take this opportunity to draw 
attention to some of the key elements in 
these important agreements. 
On the Stability and Growth Pact, I would 
first of all like to express my satisfaction 
that a compromise could be obtained at the 
Spring European Council. While obviously 
not all Commission objectives for the 
reform have been fully obtained, the 
compromise agreement presents a balanced 
package. I want to be clear that the Pact has 
neither been weakened nor loosened, 
contrary to what some media reports 
suggested. Indeed, it is important to note 
that the Pact has been confirmed as a strong 
instrument to foster budgetary discipline. It 
has been given new vigour and a better 
framework for an economically sensible 
implementation, allowing to better reflect 
the economic realities in the 25 Member 
States.  
It is particularly important that the 
preventive arm of the Pact has been 
strengthened by ensuring that due attention 
is given to the fundamentals of fiscal 
sustainability when setting medium-term 
budgetary objectives. The strengthened 
commitment by Member States to actively 
consolidate public finances under 
favourable economic conditions, and the 
possibility for the Commission to act if this 
is not the case are particularly noteworthy in 
this respect. The new agreement also 
includes incentives to embark upon 
structural reforms.  
The agreement will also improve the 
implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure by making economic analysis 
more central to the corrective arm of the 
Pact. In practice, this means that exceptions 
to the 3% deficit ceiling can be permitted 
when economic growth is negative or 
during protracted periods of very low 
growth. However, any deficit in excess of 
3% should strictly be exceptional, temporary 
and remain close to this reference value. In 
making its assessment in this context, the 
Commission will also give due consideration 
to a range of economic factors, including 
potential growth, prevailing cyclical 
conditions, the implementation of policies 
in the context of the Lisbon agenda and 
policies to foster R&D and innovation. 
Overall, I am glad to see that there is 
renewed consensus on a revised set of rules 
with more economic rationale, allowing 
more ownership and ultimately more 
effective implementation. In this context, it 
is particularly welcome that the 
Commission’s responsibility as guardian of 
the Pact has been confirmed and 
strengthened in the direction of early policy 
advice and assessment of Member States’ 
budgetary policies. You can rest assured that 
I will devote myself to a forceful 
implementation of the agreement reached 
and, in this context, ensure the impartial and 
equal application of the rules to all Member 
States. Over the coming months, the main 
challenge ahead is to transpose the 
agreement on the Pact into the legal 
framework and to make it work in practice. 
Given the increased sophistication of the 
new rules, this will indeed be challenging. 
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Following the request of the Spring 
European Council, the Commission will 
swiftly move on and present to the Council 
the legislative proposals which implement 
the changes that we have agreed. The 
Commission will do everything necessary to 
ensure that the Council will be able to adopt 
the amended Regulations before the 
summer.  
Putting in place a framework for sound 
budgetary policies is a pre-condition for 
achieving a higher rate of sustainable growth 
in Europe; so too are structural reforms to 
promote efficient, flexible and adaptable 
markets in the face of globalisation, new 
technologies and changing cyclical 
conditions. Our estimates show that the 
combination of product and labour market 
reforms and increased knowledge 
investments foreseen within the Lisbon 
strategy could increase the EU’s potential 
growth rate by three quarters of a 
percentage point. Over a ten-year period, 
this would imply an increase in the GDP 
level of up to 7 or 8 per cent. Given that 
ageing populations could reduce the EU’s 
growth potential by as much as 1 percentage 
point by 2040, Europe cannot afford to 
forgo the potential gains from the Lisbon 
Strategy. 
I am confident that the European Council’s 
agreement on the Mid-Term Review of the 
Lisbon Strategy will provide a fresh impetus 
to the EU’s economic reform agenda. The 
basic idea is to sharpen the focus of the 
reform efforts and to adjust the governance 
system in order to enhance the ownership at 
the national level.  
The Commission will put growth and 
employment at the heart of the Lisbon 
Strategy by pursuing growth and stability 
oriented macroeconomic policies and well 
targeted structural reforms. Growth and 
jobs are fundamental prerequisites for social 
cohesion and an essential basis on which to 
build the political will to pursue 
environmental policies. It is essential to 
prioritise better by identifying a limited set 
of concrete reform measures and then 
devote all efforts to achieving them. This is 
why the Integrated Guidelines that the 
Commission presented on 12 April 
identifies three priority areas for action. 
First, Europe needs to increase its 
attractiveness for investment. To this end, it 
is important to complete the Internal 
Market, particularly in services and financial 
markets, and to take measures to improve 
the business environment, regulation and 
infrastructure. Second, Europe should 
promote knowledge and innovation by 
encouraging investment in research and 
development, improving the dissemination 
of knowledge, facilitating innovation, and 
fostering the uptake of ICT. And third, 
actions need to be taken to generate 
employment. Appropriate measures should 
increase employment and participation rates, 
and the flexibility of labour markets. 
The revitalised Lisbon Strategy will be 
accompanied by a more effective system of 
governance that will tackle the persistent 
implementation gap by encouraging a 
greater sense of ownership at the national 
level. Member States have agreed to 
streamline their follow-up to the renewed 
Lisbon Strategy by formulating 
comprehensive national action plans 
specifying their reform intentions for the 3-
year coordination cycle. I am confident that 
these single national reform programs will 
ensure a more coherent national policy 
strategy and promote a deeper debate in the 
Member States by involving national 
parliaments and other stakeholders.  
Of course, reaching a consensus on policy 
aims and putting in place a credible system 
of economic governance to back them up is 
only the first step towards raising Europe’s 
growth potential. Implementation of agreed 
policies in each Member State over the next 
few years will be essential. 
Joaquín ALMUNIA 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
In 2004, growth in the euro area was the highest in four years, rebounding to close to its potential. However, after a strong 
start, the pace of the expansion eased considerably during the second half of the year with GDP growth falling below 1% in 
annualised terms. Weaker growth in world trade, high oil prices and the strengthening of the euro all took their toll on 
activity, weighing in particular on the euro-area’s export performance. On a more positive note, domestic demand began to 
send some signs of strengthening. A modest recovery in investment has been in place since the second quarter of 2004 while 
private consumption gathered momentum in the fourth quarter. Hard data point to a pick-up of GDP growth during the first 
months of 2005 as the deceleration of global trade growth comes to a halt and domestic demand continues to improve. 
However, business surveys have been sending mixed signals since the beginning of the year, suggesting that the underlying 
strength of the economy should not be overestimated. Inflation has shown signs of easing but oil prices pose an upside risk to 
the short-term outlook for consumer prices and for household purchasing power. In addition, the labour market has so far 
remained subdued, holding back gains in household disposable income and confidence. Investment is benefiting from supportive 
financing conditions, improved profitability and repaired balance sheets but there is some evidence that the slowdown in total 
factor productivity experienced in the euro area since the 1990s is still weighing on long-term trends in capital formation. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
In a context of subdued GDP growth during 
the second half of last year… 
For the first time since 2000, economic activity in 
the euro area grew around potential once again 
last year. Despite rising oil prices and the 
appreciation of the euro, real GDP is estimated 
to have increased by 2.0% in 2004 (1.8% on a 
working day adjusted basis), mainly supported by 
strong global growth and trade. Accordingly, the 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 7 April 2005.  
region experienced a considerable pick-up 
compared to the previous year, when growth 
reached 0.6%.  
However, while showing a healthy performance 
over the year as a whole, the pace of economic 
expansion eased between the first and the second 
half of 2004. After surprising on the upside in 
the first two quarters, with growth rates above 
potential, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was 
estimated at 0.2% in the fourth quarter of 2004, 
unchanged from a downwardly revised estimate 
in the third quarter. This compares to  
 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2004 Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
Carryover 
to 2005 2004 (2) 2005 (2) 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.7  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.4   2.0 1.6 
Private consumption 0.8  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.4   1.3 1.6 
Government consumption 0.2  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.4   1.7 1.4 
Gross fixed capital formation -0.1  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.9   2.1 2.8 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.0  0.1  0.8  0.7  0.3   0.4 0.3 
Exports of goods and services 1.4  2.7  1.3  0.5  1.7   6.0 5.4 
Imports of goods and services 0.4  2.4  3.1  1.0  2.9   6.2 6.0 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.2   0.7 0.9 
Government consumption 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1   0.3 0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2   0.4 0.6 
Changes in inventories -0.1  0.1  0.7  -0.1  0.3   0.4 0.0   
Net exports 0.4  0.2  -0.7  -0.2  -0.4   0.1 -0.1 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Spring 2005 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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the 0.6% average growth rate recorded in the 
first half of 2004.  
To a large extent, the weakening of economic 
activity reflected the slower pace of foreign 
demand. The contribution of net trade to GDP 
growth turned negative in the second half of 
2004, reducing the euro-area’s quarterly GDP 
growth rate by about 0.5 of a percentage point. 
Apart from its impact on average growth in 2004, 
the slower pace of economic activity in the 
second half of the year limits the carry-over to 
annual GDP growth this year.  
… domestic demand showed encouraging 
signs of a pick-up in Q4 
Regarding the expenditure breakdown in the last 
quarter of 2004, the major positive stimulus was 
provided by private consumption, which showed 
an encouraging pick-up by 0.5% from a broadly 
flat pattern observed in the previous two 
quarters. Public consumption growth, on the 
other hand, moderated to 0.2% from 0.4% in the 
third quarter. 
The acceleration of private consumption in the 
fourth quarter of last year is encouraging but 
there remains some uncertainty about the solidity 
of the rebound. In part, strong household 
spending may reflect some degree of correction 
following subdued consumption in the previous 
two quarters. In addition, private consumption 
was partly inflated by extended discounting in 
winter sales in many countries. This price-effect 
on real consumption growth is confirmed by the 
deceleration of consumer price inflation to 0.3% 
(q-o-q) in the fourth quarter compared to 0.6% 
in the third quarter.  
Furthermore, the persistent softness of the 
labour market still weighed on confidence and 
disposable income growth. The unemployment 
rate was 8.8% over the fourth quarter, broadly 
unchanged compared to previous months. 
Employment accelerated somewhat during the 
second half of last year (0.2%), but indicators for 
wage growth confirmed the continuation of the 
moderation observed in the last two years. 
Negotiated wages increased by 2.2% in the 
fourth quarter of 2004, a four year low. With 
inflation hovering around 2% since the beginning 
of the year, gains in real labour income were 
therefore limited. Overall, the positive fourth 
quarter performance for household consumption 
should be viewed with caution, as it may 
overstate the underlying strength of consumer 
spending in the euro area. 
Growth in gross fixed capital formation was 
stable at 0.6% in the fourth quarter, though this 
marked a pick-up compared to the first half of 
2004. The upward movement of investment was 
backed by rising capacity utilisation in the 
manufacturing sector, which edged up just above 
its 10-year average level for the first time since 
1999. At the same time, industrial new orders 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2004-2005 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.0 0.00 2.86 52.2 54.3 95.6   -9.5 34.5
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
April 2004 99.8   0.36 5.05 54.0  54.5  97.7   -0.5   49.7  
May 2004 100.2   0.27 4.49 54.7  55.8  97.7   -2.5   46.4  
June 2004 99.6   0.38 3.7 54.4  55.3  96.0   -2.0   47.4  
July 2004 100.0   0.56 3.09 54.7  55.3  97.1   4.1   48.4  
August 2004 100.9   0.48 2.57 53.9  54.5  95.9   -2.1   45.3  
September 2004 100.9   0.51 2.32 53.1  53.3  95.7   -1.1   38.4  
October 2004 101.5   0.53 2.04 52.4  53.5  95.9   -0.5   31.3  
November 2004 100.9   0.39 1.89 50.4  52.6  94.3   -6.6   13.9  
December 2004 100.2   0.44 1.5 51.4  52.6  96.5   -5.3   14.4  
January 2005 100.8   0.40 0.97 51.9  53.4  97.5   -5.0   26.9  
February 2005 98.8   0.20 0.91 51.9  53.0  96.4   -11.4   35.9  
March 2005 97.4 -0.08 50.4 53.0    94.6   -9.4 36.3
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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rose strongly by more than 5% on the quarter 
and the annual growth rate of loans to non-
financial corporations strengthened from 2.1% in 
the third quarter to 3% in the fourth,2 thus 
confirming the moderate upward trend observed 
since early 2004. In a context of improved 
profitability, corporate balance sheets also 
benefited from the revaluation of companies’ 
large stock of share holdings. As to residential 
construction, the financing conditions of the 
household sector remained supportive in the 
fourth quarter of 2004 with interest rates on 
loans for house purchase at historically low 
levels. At the end of last year, annual growth in 
mortgage lending by Monetary and Financial 
Institutions (MFIs) was running at about 10%, 
fuelling house price dynamics and, to a lesser 
degree, residential construction in several parts of 
the euro area. 
On the other hand, the very high level of 
inventory accumulation in the last two quarters 
of 2004 is of some concern as it may reflect a 
mini inventory cycle, with firms accumulating 
unsold goods as a consequence of the 
unanticipated slowdown in demand.  
Meanwhile, growth in euro-area exports 
decreased further in the fourth quarter to 0.5%. 
Exports came under increasing pressure from the 
softening of global growth around the middle of 
2004. In addition, the appreciation of the euro 
since 2002 appears to have been a gradually 
increasing burden on external competitiveness. 
Indeed, in the last quarter of 2004, the euro’s real 
effective exchange rate based on the HICP3 
deflator moved to its highest level in seven years. 
Thanks, however, to a significant decline in 
import growth, the negative contribution of net 
foreign demand was less pronounced in the 
                                                     
2  In the meantime, loans granted by the narrower group of 
Monetary and Financial Institutions picked up from 4.5% 
to 5.4%. MFIs are the financial institutions which form 
the money issuing sector in the euro area. In addition to 
MFIs, some loans are also granted by non-MFI financial 
corporations including insurance companies, pension 
funds and other financial intermediaries. Non-MFI 
financial corporations account for about 15% of total 
outstanding loans to non-financial corporations but the 
share has shown a marked downward trend in the past 
few years.  
3 The same conclusion holds when different price deflators 
are used (e.g. unit labour costs or export prices). 
fourth quarter (-0.2 percentage points) than in 
the third (-0.7 percentage points). 
Graph 1: Total exports and real effective exchange rate, 
euro area (2001Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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(1) q-o-q % change, sa;  
(2) Index : January 2003=100 (based on Unit Labour Costs). 
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, the breakdown of euro-area GDP 
components shows that domestic demand drove 
growth in the fourth quarter of 2004. This was in 
marked contrast with the first half of the year 
when it was disappointingly subdued.  
Graph 2: GDP growth in selected euro-area countries 
(Quarter-on-quarter % changes in 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Divergence among Member States in quarterly 
growth rates was considerable in the final quarter 
of 2004 (see Graph 2). Among the largest 
Member States, GDP declined unexpectedly in 
Germany (-0.2%) and Italy (-0.3%), while growth 
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remained robust in France and Spain (0.8%).4 An 
important element influencing intra-area growth 
dispersion is the behaviour of private 
consumption. While in France and Spain 
consumption has been growing at a robust pace, 
in Italy and Germany household spending 
remained subdued. This may partly reflect the 
different performance of the labour market in 
these countries.   
Positive news from hard data but surveys 
send more mixed signals  
The data available so far for the first quarter of 
2005 are still limited and do not provide a clear 
message about how much momentum actually 
exists in the economy. Some data appear to imply 
a bounce-back of growth in the first quarter 
relative to the sluggish pace registered during the 
second half of last year, while others suggest that 
the underlying growth momentum remains 
relatively soft. 
Judging by the hard data published so far, 
January was a positive month for euro-area 
activity. Manufacturing output was up by 0.5% 
relative to the previous month with a particularly 
strong increase in Germany (2.8%). Despite a 
sizeable correction relative to the December 
reading, industrial new orders in the euro area 
remained on an upward trend. In addition, retail 
sales rose by 0.3% in both January and February, 
after being flat in the previous two months. 
Retail spending bounced back strongly by 2.1% 
in Germany in January and regained strength in 
France and Spain in February.  
On the other hand, euro-area survey data for the 
first quarter of the year have been more mixed. 
After a generally positive reading in January, 
most business surveys showed a setback in 
February and March, although in both industry 
and services they remain consistent with a 
continuation of moderate growth.  
                                                     
4  However, it is worth noting that statistical working day 
adjustments partly related to the timing of public holidays 
have played a role in explaining the weak growth rate 
performance. In the case of Germany, in particular, 
output grew by 0.4% in the fourth quarter of 2004, when 
measured in non-working day adjusted terms. 
Following sideways movements during the last 
quarter of 2004 up to January of this year, the 
Commission’s Business Climate Indicator 
decreased significantly in February and fell again 
considerably in March, returning to a level 
comparable to that reached in March 2004 (see 
Graph 3). A similar but moderated trend is 
visible also for Reuters Purchasing Manager’s 
Index (PMI) for manufacturing. Following an 
average reading of 51.4 in the final quarter of 
2004, the index stabilised in January and 
February at 51.9,  but fell substantially to 50.4 in 
March. While the average value for the index 
remains therefore unchanged at the beginning of 
2005 compared with the fourth quarter of 2004, 
latest data point towards a weakening of the 
euro-area recovery.  
Graph 3: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Mar 2000 to Mar 2005) 
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(1) Normalised 
Source: Commission services. 
According to the European Commission 
Business Survey, the services sector lost 
momentum in February and March, more than 
reversing the gains registered in January. 
Similarly, Reuters Index for services worsened 
between January and March, but remains above 
the index reading at the end of 2004. Across 
Member States, the declines in Germany and 
Italy more than offset the rise in France, 
reinforcing the familiar pattern of cross-country 
divergence in domestic performance. However, 
in the euro area as a whole, the current level of 
the index (53) is well above the threshold that 
separates expansions from contractions of 
economic activity.  
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All in all, the mixed signals sent by recent 
indicators reflect, on the one hand, the positive 
support to growth stemming from an 
accommodative monetary policy, still buoyant 
global growth and improved corporate health 
and, on the other, the headwinds of a strong 
currency, high oil prices, subdued labour market 
developments and lack of confidence. 
A rebound of GDP growth in the first quarter 
of 2005 
According to the European Commission’s 2005 
Spring Forecasts, GDP is estimated to have 
expanded by 0.5% q-o-q in the first quarter of 
2005. The quarterly growth profile is forecast to 
remain relatively constant over the rest of the 
year, with growth averaging 1.6% for the year as 
a whole (Graph 4). 
Graph 4: GDP growth, euro area (1) 
(Quarter-on-quarter changes in % –  2001Q1 to 2005Q4) 
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(1) European Commission’s Spring 2005 Economic Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Available monthly data suggest that the 
deceleration in world trade growth has probably 
come to an end. However, the momentum in 
world trade remains so far disappointing 
compared with the growth rates reached during 
the first half of 2004. In addition, euro-area 
exports will continue to be dampened by past 
losses in competitiveness, due to the 
strengthening of the euro. Overall, the 
contribution from net exports to euro-area 
growth is likely to be rather modest in the 
coming quarters. The contribution of net trade to 
GDP growth is forecast to be slightly negative in 
the first quarter of 2005 and projected to remain 
close to zero over the forecast horizon.  
By contrast, in an extension of the pattern that 
emerged towards the end of last year, growth in 
domestic demand should accelerate.  
Private consumption growth is estimated to have 
expanded by 0.5% in the first quarter of the year, 
the same pace as in the previous quarter. In the 
remainder of the year, household purchasing 
power should benefit from decelerating inflation, 
a somewhat more supportive labour market and 
some return of confidence.  
The pace of investment expenditure is estimated 
to have strengthened further, rising by 0.8% in 
the first quarter of the year. In the remainder of 
the year, a combination of continued wage 
moderation and output outpacing employment 
growth will help to bring real unit labour costs 
down, boosting corporate profits in the process 
and encouraging investment. In addition, 
historically low costs of debt financing should 
further support firms’ investment plans. 
Nevertheless, as discussed further in Section 2, 
capital formation is likely to continue to be 
hampered by the trend deceleration of the pace 
of technical progress observed in the euro area 
since the late 1990s, and is therefore likely to 
experience only a moderate recovery.  
An improvement of the labour market remains 
crucial for the medium-term sustainability of 
private domestic demand. To this end, survey 
data continue to suggest ongoing modest 
employment growth in the economy as a whole. 
At the sectoral level, the stabilisation of 
employment expectations in the European 
Commission Industry Survey and the slight 
improvement of the employment component in 
PMI for manufacturing since the beginning of 
the year suggest that the growth disappointment 
in the second half of 2004 has not triggered a 
sharpening of the labour market adjustment in 
industry. A broadly similar picture holds for the 
services sector. According to the European 
Commission Survey, employment expectations in 
the first quarter of 2005 were slightly less positive 
than in the last quarter of 2004 while the PMI 
index signals broadly stable conditions relative to 
the last quarter. However, the PMI indicator 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2005 
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remains compatible with ongoing employment 
growth in the sector. 
Risks tilted to the downside 
The recent softening of business confidence and 
developments in the external environment of the 
euro area suggest that the risks to the growth 
outlook remain tilted to the downside. 
Global imbalances continue to pose a downside 
risk, with the US current account balance deficit 
set to widen to 5.9% of GDP in 2005. The 
unwinding of such imbalances could lead to 
disorderly movements in exchange rates, which 
would also impact on confidence and real 
activity, including world trade.  
Recent developments have increased the 
likelihood of a prolonged period of high and 
volatile oil prices. On a more positive side, 
however, a strong euro can partially shield the 
euro area from the increases in commodity 
prices.  
A stronger-than-expected deceleration in 
inflation may be considered to be an upside risk 
for private consumption. On the other hand, 
overheating in specific housing markets may 
carry the potential for adverse corrections in 
consumer sentiment and spending. 
Gross fixed capital formation appears to be the 
only area of economic activity where the risks are 
on the upside. Indeed, corporate investment has 
been rather subdued, when judged by the 
favourable financing conditions, improved 
profitability and the progress made in corporate 
restructuring. A more dynamic profile for 
investment as a result of the release of pent-up 
demand, cannot be excluded. Moreover, the past 
weakness of investment, which has led to a 
deterioration of the capital stock, should support 
replacement investment, particularly in the ICT 
sector. 
Finally, further deterioration in competitiveness 
in some Member States, which would dampen 
their growth, is also a downside risk for the euro-
area’s aggregate growth performances. 
World growth is becoming more unbalanced  
The deceleration in world trade growth, that 
followed the very strong recovery observed in 
late 2003 and early 2004 seems to have come to 
an end. After a strong reading in November, 
monthly CPB data have shown relatively sluggish 
month-on-month growth in world trade in 
December and January. However, month-on-
month changes in the CPB data can be highly 
volatile and smoother measures of growth, such 
as the change in the three month moving 
average, have shown a bottoming out of trade 
growth since December.  
There are signs that global activity has become 
less balanced, with US, China and most emerging 
market economies ending 2004 on a strong note, 
while growth remained weak in the euro area and 
Japan. Partly because of this, global current 
account imbalances have widened, which, as 
already highlighted, could increase the risk of an 
abrupt adjustment later on.  
Graph 5: Oil prices – barrel of Brent  
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Source: Datastream. 
The recent surge in oil prices, which has taken 
the price of Brent to new record highs, could 
also dampen growth somewhat. Oil prices 
continue to be underpinned by ongoing strong 
growth in global demand, particularly from China 
and India, a lack of spare capacity, relatively low 
stock levels, and ongoing threats of disruption to 
supply. In a very tight oil market, there is a risk 
of prices rising further in the event of a supply or 
demand shock. 
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Recent developments in the United States - The US 
economy ended its third year of expansion with 
an estimated growth rate of 3.8% in the fourth 
quarter of 2004. For the year as a whole, real 
GDP expanded by 4.4%, the highest growth rate 
in five years. The main contributing factors were 
strong household and business spending. Private 
consumption was supported by a resumption in 
employment growth after two years of “jobless 
recovery”. The labour market continued to 
improve gradually in the first quarter of 2005 
although payroll employment growth slowed 
somewhat.  
Inflation, measured by the increase in the 
headline consumer price index (CPI), has edged 
up against the background of higher energy 
prices and a continuing downward trend in the 
dollar’s exchange value. Twelve-month “core” 
inflation, i.e. excluding the volatile components 
of food and energy, reached 2.3% in January 
2005 when measured by the CPI. At the same 
time, inflation expectations have stayed well 
anchored. The Federal Reserve has removed 
monetary stimulus since June 2004 by raising 
short-term interest rates at a measured but steady 
pace.  
The European Commission’s Spring 2005 
Economic Forecasts points to a moderate 
slowdown in 2005. Household spending is 
expected to stay relatively strong in the first half 
of 2005, benefiting from still accommodative 
financial conditions and the related rise in home 
prices, in spite of the dampening effect of higher 
energy prices. A slowdown is expected to set in 
around the middle of the year as a result of rising 
interest rates and the withdrawal of fiscal 
stimulus. Residential investment, in particular, is 
likely to receive a setback from rising long-term 
interest rates. Business investment may also slow 
down somewhat from the very robust growth 
seen over the past two years, partly because 
profit margins are expected to be under pressure 
from the cyclical downturn in productivity 
growth. Net exports are not likely to make a 
positive contribution to output growth this year. 
Recent developments in Japan - After experiencing a 
technical recession in the middle of last year, 
with output falling in both the second and the 
third quarter, the Japanese economy expanded 
modestly in the fourth quarter, with GDP 
growth reaching 0.5% on the back of a build-up 
in inventories. In spite of the weak performance 
in the last three quarters of 2004, strong growth 
in late 2003 and early 2004 resulted in an annual 
growth rate of 2.7% for the year as a whole, the 
highest since 1996. With the global outlook 
remaining relatively favourable, the major 
inventory adjustment expected to end and 
corporate profitability improving, partly as a 
result of a high capacity utilisation rate, the 
economy should rebound in the first half of 
2005. However, the growth rate for the year as a 
whole is expected to be dampened by carry-over 
effects from 2004. 
The year-on-year change in headline CPI turned 
positive last autumn, but this was largely due to a 
strong rise in fresh food prices. Core CPI, on the 
other hand, continued to fall, and, in January this 
year, the year-on-year fall stood at 0.3%. Given 
the very slow deceleration in underlying deflation 
and the lower growth projections, the year-on-
year change in core CPI may turn positive only 
around the turn of the year.  
Recent developments in other parts of the world - In the 
rest of the world, GDP growth continues to be 
very strong. Asian economies continue to grow 
at a rapid pace, with the tsunami expected to 
have only a very limited macroeconomic effect. 
In China, GDP growth is estimated to have 
reached 9.5% in 2004. After decelerating sharply 
in the second quarter, as a result of measures 
taken to rein in investment in some sectors, 
growth regained strength in the second half of 
the year. In Latin America, economic growth is 
estimated to have exceeded 5½% in 2004, with 
most economies expanding rapidly. While 
supported by high commodity prices and 
favourable financing conditions, growth in the 
region has become increasingly domestic-driven. 
However, the region remains vulnerable to shifts 
in investor sentiment.  
Economic growth also remains sustained in most 
of the euro-area’s closest neighbours. Most of the 
newly acceded Member States continued to show 
a strong growth performance in 2004. In the UK, 
growth was supported by strong domestic 
demand, averaging 3.1% last year. EU candidate 
countries and many CIS countries remain on a 
high growth path. In Russia, however, growth 
decelerated at the end of last year, partly due to 
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lower business confidence resulting from slower 
structural reforms and increased government 
intervention in the economy. 
Inflation is easing  
Euro-area annual HICP inflation decreased 
markedly at the beginning of 2005. After having 
reached 2.4% in December 2004, headline 
inflation came down to 1.9% in January 2005 and 
went up slightly in February, to 2.1%. Eurostat’s 
latest Flash estimate points to a stable reading at 
2.1% in March.  
The rise in February was due to increases in food 
price inflation and energy price inflation. The rise 
in food prices is partly due to the effect of cold 
weather on some crops. Energy prices have kept 
rising in recent weeks and could put upward 
pressure in inflation in the next few months. On 
the other hand, base effects could offset these 
pressures as energy prices were also rising a year 
ago. Except for a small hiccup in December, core 
inflation has been on a clear downward trend 
since the summer. The HICP excluding energy 
and unprocessed food, fell to 1.6% in February, 
after 1.7% in January and 2.1% in December. 
Graph 6: HICP Inflation, euro area 
(y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2001 to March 2005) 
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(1) March is only available for the HICP as whole (Flash estimate). 
Source: Commission services. 
The European Commission’s Spring 2005 
Economic Forecasts project HICP inflation to 
average 1.9% in 2005. This is in line with other 
forecasts (Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
ECB staff macroeconomic projections) which 
project headline inflation in the euro area to 
decrease further and to stay below 2% in 2005. 
More generally, both short and long-term 
inflation expectations appear relatively muted. 
According to DG ECFIN’s Business and Consumer 
Survey, producers and consumers foresee 
downward pressure on prices in the months to 
come. In the meantime, developments in 
inflation-indexed bonds indicate that financial 
market participants expect a long-term inflation 
rate of around 2.1 percent. Overall the short-
term outlook for inflation appears relatively 
benign. However, future oil price developments 
and possible changes in indirect taxes and 
administered prices are possible sources of 
upside risks for the inflation outlook. 
Monetary and financial conditions  
Monetary conditions in the euro area, as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), tightened in the fourth quarter of 2004 
but improved slightly in January and February 
2005.  
Graph 7: The euro area  MCI and its contributors  
(inverted scale –  Jan 1999 to Feb 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Movements in the MCI were driven by exchange 
rate changes as the ECB has left its key policy 
rate unchanged at 2% since June 2003. Nominal 
and real short-term interest rates are still very low 
by historical standards. Real short-term rates are 
currently still close to zero in the euro area, well 
below the 4.5% average registered in the 1990s. 
Financial market participants expect the ECB to 
keep interest rates on hold at least until the 
autumn. Market expectations, as derived from 
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future contracts, price in a first rate hike in the 
second half of 2005, followed by two more steps 
of 25 basis points each in 2006. 
Since its rally in the last months of 2004, the euro 
exchange rate has been on a rollercoaster, 
moving from 1.36 USD/EUR in December to 
below 1.28 USD/EUR in February, back to 1.34 
in March and below 1.29 at the end of March. 
On 7 April, the euro exchange rate stood at 1.29 
USD/EUR. Explanations for the rollercoaster 
were alternating either positive news on the US 
economy when the dollar gained strength (as well 
as expectations about further Fed rate hikes) or 
renewed concerns about the US current account 
deficit when the euro was gaining strength.  
Graph 8: Exchange rate developments  
(1 Jan 2003 to 7 April 2005) 
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(1) Nominal effective exchange rate against 41 countries 
1/1/03=100.  
Source: Commission services and Datastream. 
In the United States, the Fed has continued to 
remove monetary policy stimulus. Since 30 June, 
policy rates were raised seven times, totalling 175 
basis points, to reach 2.75% in March 2005. 
Despite these rate hikes, monetary conditions in 
the United States are still accommodative with 
real short-term interest rates still close to zero 
and a depreciating currency. 
On financial markets, the excess liquidity which 
has built up over the last years, has caught more 
attention recently. As a consequence of this 
excess liquidity, virtually all asset prices have 
surged over the last two years.  
Government bond yields in the euro area and the 
United States declined until the beginning of 
February. In addition to the excess liquidity 
argument, the most frequently cited explanations 
for the historically low levels of long-term 
interest rates include the selling of exchange rate 
reserves by Asian central banks for US bonds 
and a large appetite for long-duration assets 
among institutions such as pension funds and 
insurance companies.  
Graph 9: 10- year government bond yields  
(in %– 1 Jan 2003 to 7 April 2005) 
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Source: Datastream. 
Since the beginning of February, long-term 
nominal bond yields in both the euro area and 
the USA have started to recover from their very 
low levels. In the euro area, long-term bond 
yields increased by about 20 basis points to reach 
3.7% in March before declining in the first days 
of April to 3.6% on 7 April. US bond yields 
increased by 60 basis points until late March 
before easing slightly again to 4.4% in early April.  
In the US, the increase in bond yields in February 
and March was largely prompted by market 
expectations about future Fed hikes and 
reactions to Alan Greenspan’s testimony before 
the US Congress on 16 February in which he 
called the low level of long-term bond yields a 
“conundrum”. The testimony was taken by 
market participants to mean that the Fed believes 
that long-term bond yields have become 
excessively low. Moreover, markets’ inflation 
expectations seem to have shifted upwards in the 
USA (Graph 10). In contrast, economic data 
releases did not really explain the rise of long-
term yields in the euro area, as inflation data was 
lower than expected, the outlook for growth did 
not improve and inflation expectations eased 
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slightly. Therefore, the driving factor behind the 
euro-area bond yields may also have been Mr 
Greenspan’s testimony.  
Graph 10: Break- even inflation rate (1) 
(in % – 1 Apr 2002 to 7 Apr 2005) 
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(1) Based on inflation-indexed bonds. 
Source: EcoWin. 
The different developments at both sides of the 
Atlantic have further increased the spread on 
US/euro-area government bond yields to almost 
100 basis points, the highest level since March 
2000. The widening of the spread was probably 
strongly linked to the appreciation of the euro 
exchange rate in the fourth quarter of 2004, 
offsetting to some extent the negative trade 
effects from the stronger currency. By contrast, 
the recent increase in the spread rather coincided 
with a weakening of the euro exchange rate.  
Graph 11: Stock market indices  
(1/1/03=100 – 1 Jan 2003 to 7 Apr 2005) 
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Source: Datastream. 
Fuelled by excess liquidity, equities continued 
their upward trend. Major stock markets in the 
USA, Japan and the euro area gained between 
30% and 40% between the first quarter of 2003 
and the fourth quarter of 2004. Since the 
beginning of 2005, stock markets at both sides of 
the Atlantic have slightly diverged. In the euro 
area, stock markets have gained some 3% since 
January, while the Nasdaq and the Dow Jones 
have lost the gains of the last weeks of 2004. In 
particular the sharp rise in oil prices and the 
increase in long-term bond yields seemed to have 
had an overall dampening effect. 
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2. Structural factors weighing on the 
investment recovery 
Euro-area investment has expanded by less than 
2.5% in annualised terms over the past three 
quarters. The recovery has so far been 
disappointing in light of the prevailing sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Profitability has 
been improving steadily since mid-2003. 
Meanwhile real long-term financing costs are 
quite supportive and corporate balance sheets 
have improved significantly.  
Yet, only a fraction of the increased liquidities 
resulting from loans and improved cash flows 
has so far been transformed into hard 
investment. On the corporate side, there is some 
evidence that companies are instead 
accumulating short-term liquid assets or using 
existing liquidities to boost dividend payments 
and engage in share buyback activities.5 On the 
household side, the surge in mortgage credit in 
the past few quarters has been absorbed more by 
higher real estate prices than by increased 
residential construction activity. 
These developments suggest that some negative 
forces are currently still weighing on capital 
formation in the euro area. Uncertainty regarding 
the short-term outlook for domestic demand is a 
possibility. However, other factors of a more 
long-term/structural nature seem to be also 
playing a role.  
A long-term view of investment shares  
In order to put recent investment developments 
in a longer-term perspective, Graph 12 displays 
the share of total gross investment in GDP in the 
euro area over the past three decades. The share 
fell markedly in the 1970s. Since the late 1980s, it 
has been subject to large cyclical swings but has 
displayed no clear trend when measured in 
constant prices. However, a significant decrease 
in the investment deflator relative to the GDP 
deflator means that the  investment share in 
nominal terms trended further downwards in the 
1990s. 
                                                     
5  See Goldman Sachs Euroland Weekly Analyst 10th 
December 2004. 
Graph 12: Gross fixed capital formation, euro area  
(share of GDP in % –  1970-2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 13: Gross fixed capital formation, euro area  
(share of GDP in % –  constant prices – 1970-2004) 
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Source: OECD. 
Turning to the sectoral composition of capital 
formation in the euro area, Graph 13 displays the 
respective shares in total GDP of business 
investment, residential construction and 
government investment. All three sectors 
experienced a fall in their share in GDP up to the 
mid-1980s. Subsequent developments have 
diverged somewhat: 
¾ Developments in total investment tend to be 
dominated by business investment, which is 
its largest component.  
¾ The share of government investment in GDP 
dropped until the mid-1990s and stabilised 
thereafter.  
¾ After a rise in the early 1990s, the share of 
residential construction fell during the second 
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half of the 1990s and has remained broadly 
constant in the past few years. 
Two arguments suggest that developments in 
investment in the 1990s were disappointing 
despite the absence of a clear downward trend in 
the overall gross investment share.  
Graph 14: Net fixed capital formation and depreciation 
rate of the capital stock, euro area  
(in % –constant prices – 1970-2004) 
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(1) Net total investment as a share of GDP.  
(2) As a share of the capital stock. 
Source: Commission services. 
First, the increasing importance of investment 
equipment with a short lifespan, particularly ICT, 
has translated into a noticeable rise of the speed 
of depreciation of the capital stock since the 
1980s. As a result, and contrary to the relative 
stability observed in the case of gross investment, 
the share of net investment (i.e. excluding 
depreciation) in GDP has shown a persistent 
downward trend over the past two decades 
(Graph 14). The trend decline in net investment 
shares is particularly visible in the business sector 
in countries including Finland, Germany, and 
Belgium. This can be seen in Table 3 which 
displays the change in the ratio of net business 
investment to business value added between the 
peaks of the two latest investment cycles for 
some Member States.6   
Second, large improvements in some key 
determinants of capital formation in the 1990s 
should, a-priori, have led to a trend rise of the 
                                                     
6  The shares are based on OECD data, which are only 
available for some Member States and not for the euro 
area as a whole.  
investment share over the same period. As 
discussed in a previous issue of this report, 
measures of profitability showed a sharp 
improvement in the euro area during much of 
the 1990s.7 Furthermore, the cost of capital has 
been on a marked downward trend since the 
mid-1990s mostly due to falling real interest rates 
and, to a lesser degree, to a drop in the relative 
price of investment equipment (Graph 15).  
Table 3: Changes in net business investment 
shares(1) between cyclical peaks  
(selected euro area Member States) 
 Peak years  Change in, share (2) 
Belgium 1990-2000 -2.5 
Germany 1992-2001 -4.1 
Spain 1991-2000 -1.0 
France 1991-2000  0.0 
Ireland 1990-1999  3.0 
Italy 1990-2000 -0.8 
Netherlands 1990-1999  1.3 
Austria 1991-2000  0.4 
Finland 1989-2001 -9.9 
(1) Share of net business investment in constant prices divided by 
business value added in constant prices. 
(2) Change in percentage points between the two peak years. 
Source: based on OECD data 
 
Graph 15: Real cost of capital,(1) euro area  
(index 1995=100 –  1985-2004) 
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(1) The real cost of capital is based on the Jorgenson formula. It 
takes into account changes in real interest rates, in capital 
depreciation and in the relative price of investment equipment.  
Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
7  Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Volume 3, No 3 
(2004). 
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Overall, developments in investment since the 
1990s suggest that some factors of a structural or 
longer-term nature were already weighing on 
capital formation in the euro area in the period of 
relatively sustained growth of the late 1990s and 
are probably still hampering the investment 
recovery today. The euro-area economy has 
undergone a number of shocks over the past 15 
years, some of which may have left a lasting 
legacy on capital formation. Possible candidates 
include the construction boom/bust due the 
German unification process, globalisation, a 
significant slowdown in technical progress and a 
positive employment shock.   
The unification overhang  
A possible explanation for the ongoing 
sluggishness of investment spending in the euro 
area is the negative effect of the capital overhang 
resulting from the construction boom that 
followed German unification in the early 1990s. 
Between 1990 and 1994, German construction 
investment increased by about 24% in constant 
prices, leading to a significant increase in the 
investment share. Although the surge reflected 
the one-off need to install a modern capital base 
and refurbish the housing stock in the new 
eastern Länder, it probably also led to some 
overinvestment.  
Graph 16: Investment in construction as a share of 
GDP, euro area (in % –  constant prices – 1980-2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Sluggish construction investment in Germany 
has unquestionably weighed on the euro-area 
investment share since the mid-1990s (Graph 16) 
and is continuing to hamper the recovery. 
Nevertheless, in the past few years, it has become 
increasingly difficult to ascribe this trend to the 
unification overhang. First, the share of 
construction investment in GDP in Germany has 
dropped continuously and steeply since 1994 and 
is now far below its pre-unification level.8 
Second, the breakdown of investment data by 
regions shows that the current weakness of 
German construction is attributable to both 
eastern and western Länder, with the share of 
construction investment in GDP showing a 
moderate downward trend since the mid-1990s 
in the latter (Graph 17). 
Graph 17: Investment in construction as a share of GDP 
in Germany, regional breakdown  
(in % –  constant prices – 1991-2002) 
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
West East (rhs)
 
Source: Arbeitskreis VGR dl. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that even if the 
German construction sector is still weighing on 
the euro area investment recovery, this can no 
longer be attributed to the unification overhang. 
Furthermore, although it has been an aggravating 
factor, the weakness of capital formation in 
Germany is not the only explanation for the 
sluggish performance of investment in the euro 
area in the past few years. Hence, the net total 
investment rate of the euro area excluding 
Germany has also displayed a clear downward 
trend since the 1990s.  
                                                     
8  Calculations show that even if the entire additional capital 
stock attributable to the higher than pre-unification level 
of the rate of investment observed between 1992 and 
1997 were to be considered excess capital – a quite 
extreme assumption –  the overhang would have been 
totally absorbed by the end of 2002.  
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The globalisation process  
Globalisation and the associated increasing 
importance of foreign direct investment are 
popular explanations for the investment 
weakness in the euro area.  
Graph 18: Total FDI outflows and domestic investment,  
euro area (in % of GDP 1997-2004) 
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(1) 2004 is estimated.  
Source: Commission services. 
It is true that net outflows of FDI, after having 
dropped to close to zero in 2002-03, have 
resumed an upward path since 2004. However, as 
discussed in more detail in a previous issue of 
this report,9 there is no firm evidence that FDI 
outflows have taken place at the expense of 
domestic investment in recent years. For the euro 
area as a whole, a positive correlation between 
total FDI outflows and domestic capital 
formation can be observed since the mid-1990s 
(Graph 18), suggesting that common factors are 
driving the two forms of investment. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that those 
Member States which have invested more heavily 
abroad have tended to suffer from weaker 
domestic investment rates.  
The role of TFP and employment shocks  
Total factor productivity (TFP) measures the 
efficiency with which primary factors (namely 
capital and labour) are used in the production 
process. Measures of growth in TFP can be 
                                                     
9  Focus section on “Foreign direct investment in EMU”, 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Volume 3, No 4 
(2004). 
interpreted as measures of the pace of technical 
progress. In this field, the performance of the 
euro-area economy in the past few years has been 
pretty disappointing, with a marked deceleration 
of trend TFP growth since the mid-1990s.  
In the neo-classical growth model, a downward 
shift in the pace of technical progress entails a 
drop in the steady-state (i.e. long-run) investment 
rate under fairly general conditions.10 A 
slowdown in the pace of technical progress 
negatively affects the marginal product of capital 
and thus weighs on capital accumulation. The 
effect is permanent in the sense that a permanent 
downshift in the pace of technical progress 
entails a permanent drop in the investment rate.  
Box 1 analyses relative trends in TFP and 
investment in the euro area and the USA and 
also presents the results of a panel regression of 
investment based on data for 17 countries (the 
EU-15, US and Japan). Both the comparison 
between the USA and the euro area and the 
econometric analysis provide strong support for 
the argument of a positive impact of trends in 
TFP on investment growth. It is important to 
stress that, although there could be a positive 
causal link from investment to TFP11, the lags 
observed between trends in TFP and trends in 
investment suggest that the causality mostly runs 
from TFP to capital formation.  
Turning to employment, a standard result of neo-
classical growth models is that there is a positive 
long-run (i.e. in the steady state) relation between 
growth in the capital stock and trend 
employment growth. A positive employment 
shock resulting from labour market reforms or 
changes in the wage bargaining system will entail 
a temporary acceleration in employment growth 
that will be matched by a pick-up in capital 
formation until the long-run capital to 
employment ratio is restored. The graphs in 
Box 1 provide some evidence of both a positive 
employment shock in the euro area in the 1990s 
                                                     
10  See for instance King, R. G., Plosser, C. I. and S. Rebelo 
(2002), “Production growth and business cycles: technical 
appendix”, Computational Economics, 20(1-2), pp 87-
116. 
11  For instance, via the technological progress embedded in 
new generations of capital equipment.  
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Box 1: Total factor productivity, labour supply and capital formation 
 
The most important prediction of standard growth models is that trend growth of the physical capital stock is 
determined by trend employment growth and the growth rate of technical progress. These factors also play a role in 
the short run but there are other short-run factors such as variations in aggregate demand which affect investment 
behaviour.  
A good testing ground for assessing secular trends between employment and TFP on the one hand and capital 
formation on the other is a comparison between the euro area and the USA over the last few decades. Both regions 
have shown very distinct patterns of TFP growth. Starting from a declining growth trend of TFP in both areas in the 
70s, a divergence emerged in the 80s. The US achieved an acceleration of TFP growth which has continued until the 
present. In contrast, euro-area TFP has declined persistently. According to standard growth models this 
development should be mirrored by trend growth rates in the capital stock. As can be seen from the two graphs 
below, this is indeed the case.  
In the euro area the decline in the trend growth of capital accumulation closely follows the trend decline of TFP 
growth with a certain lag. Some inertia in the investment response must be expected because of the uncertain nature 
of trend revisions in real time. Since the late 1990s a divergence can be seen, with capital growth declining less than 
predicted by the TFP trend. This is due to stronger employment growth in the euro area. 
In the case of the US the trend growth of the capital stock started to accelerate after the increase in TFP growth in 
the early 80s, though with a considerable lag. Apart from inertia in the investment response, an important factor 
preventing a rapid trend reversal in capital growth was the decline in the growth of labour input which started in the 
80s. The parallel movement between capital and TFP growth in the 90s is surprising given the decline in the trend 
growth of employment. A possible explanation for the strong measured volume growth of capital in recent years is 
the use of hedonic deflators for ICT investment which represents a significant share of total US capital formation.(*) 
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-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
Capital stock
TFP 
Employment
USA
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
Capital stock
TFP
Employment 
(1) TFP growth is calculated as the difference between the growth rate of GDP and a weighted average of capital and labour input. Labour input 
is measured in total hours of work. All trend series are calculated via the HP filter. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Does TFP and employment also affect investment in the short run?  This is more difficult to assess since theory is 
less clear about the short run and also because there are other factors such as aggregate demand and short-term 
variations in capital costs which may affect the allocation of investment over time. In order to control for these 
additional factors a panel regression for the EU-15, the US and Japan has been conducted using time series 
information for the period 1980 to 2003. As can be seen in the next table, variations in TFP and shocks to 
employment have a significant effect on investment growth. For TFP a more delayed investment response can also 
be found in the regressions with significant lags up to two years.  The elasticity of TFP growth to investment growth 
is close to two.  The change in employment is also significant. The regression results show that TFP and 
employment remain important factors after controlling for the business cycle, capital costs and stock market effects. 
The business cycle effect is captured by the growth rate of GDP and has the expected positive sign. The two 
components of capital costs, the relative price of investment goods and the real interest rate have a sizeable negative 
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impact on investment. Finally expectations of the return on capital investment captured by stock market indices 
contribute positively to investment (but the t-stat is only significant when the sample is reduced to the last 15 years). 
 
Determinants of investment 
(all variables in first differences except real interest rates) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant -0.018537 0.007279 -2.546788 0.0114
TPF 1.257118 0.307747 4.084905 0.0001
TPF (-1) 0.419652 0.169892 2.470103 0.0141
TPF (-2) 0.425716 0.157039 2.710895 0.0071
Employment  1.422957 0.204825 6.947184 0.0000
Investment price -0.655264 0.140327 -4.669540 0.0000
Real interest rate -0.002926 0.001210 -2.418156 0.0162
Stock market index 0.011408 0.10447 1.092014 0.2757
GDP 0.598971 0.241701 2.478144 0.0138
Effects specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.782928 Mean dependent var 0.022402
Adjusted R-squared 0.748377 S.D. dependent var 0.060041
S. E. of regression 0.030118 Akaike info criterion -4.038335
Sum squared resid 0.262144 Schwarz criterion -3.504394
Source: Commission services. 
 
(*) The OECD (2001) has conducted extensive international comparisons using harmonised deflators. These estimates suggest 
that over the 90s, the acceleration of US investment growth would have been more modest if EU methods to deflate nominal 
investment had been used. Based on the EU methods, annual growth in the capital stock would still have picked up in the USA 
over the decade but the acceleration would have been significantly smaller (from 2.5% to 2.8% instead of 2.5% to 3.3%). 
 
and a positive relation between capital and 
employment.12 However, the positive 
employment shock observed in the euro area has 
only partly offset the negative impact on 
investment of the adverse TFP shock. 
Conclusion  
The evidence presented in this section suggests 
that the sluggishness of the investment recovery 
in the euro area in the last three quarters may 
partly reflect longer-term structural trends and 
may not only be the consequence of short-term 
uncertainties related to the strength of consumer 
demand. This structural weakness is more likely 
to be related to the deceleration of the pace of 
technical progress registered in the euro area 
                                                     
12  It is important to stress that, although a positive 
employment shock will entail a temporary acceleration of 
capital accumulation, it will leave the long-run investment 
to GDP ratio unaffected. It may even temporarily depress 
the investment rate if capital adjustment is sluggish and 
capital accumulation responds to the acceleration of 
employment growth with a lag.  
since the 1990s than to globalisation or the 
unification overhang.  
In the years to come, faster capital accumulation 
would require either a trend improvement in the 
rate of technical progress or a further increase in 
trend employment growth. Because of a 
continued decline in the growth rate of the 
population of working age, it is unlikely that 
employment will grow at a higher rate than seen 
since the mid-90s where growth was fuelled by 
both a continuous increase in the participation 
rate and a decline in the NAIRU. Also TFP 
growth has been sluggish since 2001 and so far 
there are no signs of a fundamental trend reversal 
in the rate of technical progress in the euro area 
as a whole  
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3. Current account developments in the 
euro area 
While the US current account deficit has received 
a lot of attention, the position of the euro area 
current account has hardly been discussed. This 
might be due to the fact that the current account 
has remained close to balance since 1997. A 
small deficit was recorded in 1999-2001, which 
has turned into a surplus of less than 1% of 
GDP  since 2002.  
Graph 19: Global current account balances,  
(billions of USD – 1999 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Current account, trade and the exchange rate 
As shown in Graph 20, changes in the euro area 
current account position are dominated by 
changes in net trade in goods, with the other 
components, notably income and current 
transfers remaining relatively stable.  
Graph 20: Composition of the euro area current account 
(% of GDP – 1998  to 2004 ) 
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Source: ECB. 
Since 1997, export and import values have 
moved largely in parallel (Graph 21), suggesting 
that joint forces such as the global business cycle 
and production linkages are relatively important 
determinants of trade growth, compared to 
diverging forces such as movements in the 
exchange rate or growth differences. 
Graph 21: Trade in goods and services, euro area  
(% of GDP – 1997Q1 to 2004Q2)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Given the strong dependency of the change in 
the current account balance on net trade in 
goods, it is perhaps surprising that a current 
account deficit materialised in 1999-2001 when 
the euro depreciated, whereas a surplus was 
recorded in 2002-04 when the euro appreciated. 
However, a depreciating currency rarely causes 
an increasing current account surplus in the short 
term, given that depreciation increases the costs 
of imports, while substitution possibilities are 
limited in the short term (giving rise to the so 
called ‘J-curve’).  
Graph 22 confirms that euro-area import prices 
increased when the euro depreciated between 
1999 and end-2000. However, import volumes 
also accelerated, which suggests that it was both 
the lack of substitution possibilities and the 
impact of strong domestic demand in the euro 
area (which was then at the peak of its economic 
cycle) that caused the deficit. A surge in oil prices 
also contributed to the widening of the deficit in 
2000. Import volumes declined throughout 2001 
due to weakening domestic demand and despite 
falling import prices. 
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Graph 22:  Imports of goods, euro area(1)  
(1997Q1 to 2004Q2 – index 2000 = 100) 
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(1) Based on extra-area trade data which (unlike BOP data) are only 
available for goods but not for services. 
Source: Commission services. 
Following the euro’s appreciation from 2001, 
import prices declined, although the change in 
prices was less marked than during the 
depreciation period as oil prices remained high. 
With import volumes rebounding from 2002 
onwards, it was mainly the exchange-rate-led 
reduction in import prices that initially raised the 
current account surplus from 2002 onwards.  
Graph 23: Exports of goods, euro area (1)  
(1997Q1 to 2004Q2 – index 2000 = 100) 
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(1) Based on extra-area trade data which (unlike BOP data) are only 
available for goods but not for services. 
Source: Commission services. 
Strong export growth has played an increasingly 
important role in maintaining the surplus from 
mid-2003 onwards. Export growth has increased, 
despite the higher value of the euro, as a result of 
exporters reducing export prices in order to 
preserve market shares and the robust recovery 
in world demand. 
Saving-investment gap and the financing of 
the current account 
The current account surplus means that the euro 
area is a net exporter of capital and that, in turn, 
domestic saving is (slightly) larger than 
investment. Graph 24 shows the development of 
the euro-area’s national savings and investment 
shares over time, with the difference from the 45 
degree line approximating the current account 
balance to GDP ratio.13  
Graph 24: Investment and saving, euro area  
(% of GDP – 1996 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The changing sign of the euro-area current 
account balance over time appears to be mainly 
related to developments in the euro-area 
investment share. A deteriorating current account 
balance in 1997-2000 was accompanied by a 
rising investment share and stable saving rate. In 
2001 and 2002, both investment and savings fell 
relative to GDP, although investment decreased 
much more strongly than savings, with the 
opposite happening in 2003.14 
                                                     
13  In contrast to Graph 19, Graph 24 shows a current 
account surplus in 1999 and 2001. This is due to the fact 
that ECB BOP data is adjusted for reporting errors 
whereas saving and investment in national accounts is 
not. 
14  It is worth stressing that changes in the euro-area current 
account since 2000 have been dominated by the 
progressive build-up of a large current account surplus in 
Germany which, itself, owes both to an increase in the 
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The sector breakdown of the savings-investment 
gap reveals that a major factor behind the relative 
stability of the current account in the euro area 
(at least when compared with the USA) has been 
the almost complete offsetting effect of changes 
in the public and the private savings-investment 
gap (Graph 25). During the second half of the 
1990s, improving government balances were 
offset by a deterioration of private sector 
balances. Since 2000 the opposite offsetting 
effect has been observed. The symmetry between 
the behaviours of the private and the public 
sector may be partly explained by the fact that 
both sectors have been affected in opposite ways 
by the same cyclical developments. It may, 
however, also be an indication that so-called 
Ricardian effects have, to some extent, been at 
play, with the private sector partly adjusting its 
savings-investment gap in response to changes in 
the government balance.  
Graph 25: Sectoral breakdown of saving/investment 
gap, euro area (% of GDP – 1996 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that developments 
in investment and savings behaviour were similar 
among non-financial corporations and 
households, suggesting that both sub-sectors 
have been exposed to similar factors. 
The euro-area current account surplus is 
accompanied by a deficit in the financial and 
capital account of the balance of payments. This 
signifies that the euro area is a net investor 
                                                                              
national saving rate and, above all, a substantial drop in 
the investment rate. 
overseas, with a negative figure in the financial 
account referring to positive net investment 
outside the euro area.  
Interpreting changes in the financial and capital 
account is particularly difficult given the large 
weight of errors and omissions (which ensure 
that the different accounts of the balance of 
payments do balance) and the residual category 
of the financial account, ‘other investment’. 
Graph 26: Financial account components (1) 
(net flows as a % of GDP – 1999 to 2004) 
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(1) A positive (negative) number indicates a net inflow (outflow) 
into (out of) the euro area. 
Source: ECB. 
Graph 26 shows that there has been no firm 
trend in recent years as regards the financial 
account categories in surplus or deficit with the 
residual category, which includes trade credit and 
advanced payments for exports and imports, 
playing the dominant role as counterpart to 
changes in the current account.  
The euro area has seen persistent net outflows of 
direct investment (FDI) since the late 1990s. 
After having reached a peak in 2000, net FDI 
outflows dropped dramatically to close to zero in 
2002-03 before increasing slightly again in 2004.15 
Both inflows and outflows are now well below 
the peak levels reached in 1999-2000, mirroring a 
similar decline in global FDI flows. This can 
largely be related to the bursting of the equity 
bubble in 2000 with lower equity prices and a 
                                                     
15  For a full discussion of FDI trends see Quarterly Report 
on the Euro Area Vol. 3, No.4 (2004). 
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lower level of mergers and acquisition activity 
both hampering FDI flows.  
Portfolio investment was unusually volatile at the 
start of the decade due to one-off factors 
associated with the launch of the euro (increased 
euro bond issuance, selling of euro-area equities 
in order to reintroduce currency diversification 
and changing supervisory rules16), and the 
takeovers of Mannesmann by Vodafone17 in 
2000 and of Voicestream by Deutsche Telekom 
in 2001. 
Graph 27: Portfolio Investment flows (1) 
(inflows and outflows as a % of GDP – 1999 to 2004) 
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(1) A positive (negative) number indicates an inflow (outflow) into 
(out of) the euro area. 
Source: ECB. 
                                                     
16  See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Vol. 1, No.2  
(2002) for a more detailed analysis. 
17 Vodafone’s takeover of Mannesmann in 2000  resulted in 
direct investment into the euro area of €187 billion, 
balanced by portfolio investment outside the euro area. 
It now appears that these one-off factors have 
been played out with the euro area becoming a 
net recipient of portfolio investment since 2001. 
The euro area has seen a net inflow of portfolio 
equity investment in each of the last four years 
(Graph 27) having been a net investor overseas 
in 1999 and 2000. The largest portfolio flows are 
in bonds and notes, for which the balance 
continues to fluctuate. The overall trend since 
1999 is of increasing net portfolio investment 
into the euro area in equities. Flows of debt 
instruments are almost in balance following an 
increased outflow of debt instruments over the 
last two years. 
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Focus 
II. The export performance of the euro area 
There are no apparent signs of structural weaknesses in the euro-area’s export performance. The share of euro-area exports in 
total world trade has remained relatively steady over most of the past decade. Mirroring fluctuations in the euro exchange rate, 
it increased in 2000-01 but dropped again in 2002-03. In addition to price competitiveness, geographical and sectoral 
specialisation effects may play an important role in explaining a country’s export performance. There is no evidence that 
export growth in the euro area has been hampered by less favourable specialisation than in the USA in recent years. In the 
past few years, the overall euro-area export performance has concealed large differences at Member State level. Diverging 
developments in price competitiveness have been a key source of cross-country disparities in export growth. However, these 
competitiveness effects have been partly masked by differences in geographical and, above all, sectoral specialisation. Differences 
in specialisation create the possibility for asymmetries in the transmission of common external shocks as countries respond 
differently to changes in the sectoral or geographical drivers of world trade. There is in fact some evidence that some shocks, 
mostly of a sectoral nature, have had a significant impact on country differences in export growth within the euro area since the 
late 1990s.  
 
Over the last few years, external demand has 
played a substantial role in shaping the euro-
area’s overall growth performance while making 
quite different contributions to the recovery, 
depending on the Member States considered. 
Against this background, this Focus section takes 
a closer look at the export performance of the 
euro area. A first section analyses aggregate euro-
area export growth, focusing in particular on the 
role of trade specialisation in explaining market 
share developments. A second section explores 
the Member State dimension with a view to 
assessing the factors that explain the differences 
in individual countries’ export performances.  
1. The euro-area’s position in world 
trade 
Developments in the euro-area’s share of 
world trade  
Graph 28 displays the share of euro-area exports 
(excluding intra-area trade) in total world trade of 
goods for the 1990-2003 period. The share is 
calculated both in current and in constant prices. 
It is important to stress that both measures come 
with their shortcomings. On the one hand, price 
effects, and particularly changes in the exchange 
rates, may severely distort the information 
content of the share estimated in value. On the 
other hand, price adjustments in foreign trade 
data should be considered with caution insofar as 
they are based on less sophisticated statistical 
procedures than is the case for domestic price 
indices.18  
Graph 28: The euro-area’s share of world exports of 
goods (1) (1990 to 2003) 
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(1) Ratio of extra-euro-area exports to total world exports, 
excluding intra-area trade.  
Source: WTO, Commission services. 
Developments in the euro-area’s share of world 
trade provide no evidence of systematic 
underperformance of euro-area exports over the 
last decade. After a significant deterioration in 
the early 1990s, the euro-area’s export 
performance has remained fairly stable, especially 
when measured in constant prices. Some gains in 
export share were registered in 2000-01 but were 
subsequently reversed in 2002-03.  
                                                     
18  Foreign trade price indices are generally calculated by 
dividing trade data in value by trade data in volume 
measured in physical quantities and are therefore not 
adjusted for changes in product quality.  
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Graph 29: Share of world exports of goods, euro area, 
USA and Japan (1) (in % – constant prices – 1990-2003) 
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(1) Ratio of country/area’s exports to total world exports. World 
and euro-area data exclude intra-area trade.  
Source: WTO and Commission services. 
A comparison of developments in the share of 
world exports of the euro area, the USA and 
Japan, suggests a similar picture of relatively 
good performance of euro-area exports over the 
past 10 years. Between 1993 and 2003, the euro-
area’s share (extra-area trade only) declined by 
about 0.6 percentage points. Over the same 
period, market share losses in the USA and Japan 
were of the order of 2.2 and 3.0 percentage 
points respectively.   
Graph 30: The euro-area’s share of world exports of 
goods and the real exchange rate, (1) (in % - 1990-2003) 
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(1) Excluding intra-area trade.  
Source: Commission services. 
Graph 30 shows that developments in the euro-
area’s share of world exports can partly be related 
to developments in the real exchange rate. The 
correlation between the two variables was weak 
during the first half of the 1990s. It has increased 
since the mid-1990s, with the real effective 
exchange rate leading developments in export 
share by about one year. In particular, gains in 
competitiveness in the late 1990s were associated 
with a rise in export share whereas the 
appreciation of the euro since 2001 has clearly 
weighed on the euro-area’s export performance 
in the past few years. Nevertheless, price 
competitiveness is not the only driver of changes 
in market shares. Another important determinant 
of a country’s export performance is the nature 
of its trade specialisation. This aspect is discussed 
in the next two sections.  
The geographical and sectoral structure of 
euro-area exports  
Empirical research has highlighted the 
importance of geographical proximity in 
determining trade flows. As shown in Table 4, 
exports from the euro area to other European 
countries clearly dominate euro-area exports, 
accounting for more than half of total shipments 
in 2003.  
Table 4: Geographical structure of  
euro-area exports of goods (1) 
 Share in total EU12 exports (value) 
Growth 
(volume) 
 1995 2003 1995-03
UK, SE and DK   24.8  24.2  60.7
10 New member states 7.4  11.0   141.4
Other western Europe   11.9  10.8  47.8
Other eastern Europe 4.0 5.4 118.2
India  1.1 0.9  30.6
China 2.1 3.3 159.0
Japan 4.1 2.9  16.9
Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Korea 6.3 4.3  11.8
Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Philippines 3.2 1.6  -17.7
Other Asia 0.8 0.8   57.0
Africa 7.3 5.6   23.9
North America   13.5  17.0  105.5
Latin America     5.8 4.1   14.9
Near and Middle East  5.0 5.0   65.3
Other 2.7 3.1   75.1
(1) Extra-euro-area exports.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
The euro-area’s two largest single export 
destinations are the UK and the USA. As regards 
the most distant emerging and newly 
industrialised economies, exports to Asia are far 
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higher than to Latin America, with respective 
shares in total exports of 11% and 4% in 2003. 
Africa and Near and Middle Eastern countries 
are relatively important destinations for euro-area 
exporters, accounting for 5.6% and 5% 
respectively of total exports.  
Looking at the growth picture, exports to the 
new EU Member States have been among the 
most dynamic, increasing by 140% in volume 
terms between 1995 and 2003. Other 
destinations which have experienced 
comparatively fast growth since the mid-1990s 
include other Eastern European countries, China 
and North America. In contrast, exports to Asia, 
excluding China, have been relatively sluggish, a 
development which may reflect several factors 
including the Asian crisis, intra-Asian trade 
integration and a deceleration of this region’s 
contribution to world trade growth after the mid-
1990s.  
Graph 31: The relative sectoral specialisation of  
euro-area exports of goods (1) (in % - 2002) 
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(1) Share of each sector’s exports in the regional exports of goods 
of the region considered. EU12 includes intra-area trade.  
Source: WTO. 
As regards the sectoral structure of exports, the 
euro area is deeply integrated in the global value-
added chain. This is evidenced by the fact that 
about half of euro-area exports are in 
intermediate goods. Consumer and capital goods 
constitute about 20% each. The euro area posts 
relative specialisation in manufacturing and 
particularly in the chemical, machinery and 
automotive sectors. This is shown by the fact 
that the share of these sectors in total exports is 
significantly higher for the euro area than for the 
world as a whole (Graph 31). In contrast, the 
share of office and telecom equipment is lower 
than for the world as a whole, suggesting a 
relative weakness of the euro area in that sector. 
Table 5: Sectoral structure of euro-area exports of 
goods (1) (in %)  
 
Share in total 
EU12 exports in 
value 
Growth 
volume
 1995 2003 1995-03
Agricultural 9.4 7.7 29.5
Mining products 3.8 3.7 26.9
Fuels 1.9 2.2 18.5
Manufactures 80.3  82.3   70.1
Iron and steel 5.7 4.8 44.8
Chemical products 12.8 15.3 111.3
Machin. & transp. equip. 43.4 45.6 71.2
Office & telecom equip. 9.3 9.3 71.8
Textiles and clothing 6.8 5.5 25.1
Complete plants 0.6 0.3 -38.3
Miscellaneous 17.6 17.1 61.8
Total 100 100 63.1
(1) Extra-euro-area exports. The data displayed in this table are not 
directly comparable to those shown in Table 4 
Source: Commission services.  
 
Finally, while the focus of the analysis has so far 
been on goods, a word should be said about the 
importance of trade in services. Services account 
for about 20% of total world trade in goods and 
services and a similar share of total euro-area 
exports. Given this weight, services should a 
priori constitute an important part of any analysis 
of export performance.  
Graph 32: The euro-area’s share of world exports, 
goods and services (in % – current prices – 1996 to 2002) 
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(1) Share of extra-area exports of services in world exp. of services.  
(2) Share of extra-area exp. of goods in world exp. of goods. 
Source: WTO, Commission services. 
However, a problem with the inclusion of 
services in trade share analysis is the non-
availability of trade data for services in volume. It 
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is thus impossible to calculate a joint share of 
goods and services in world trade that is 
undistorted by exchange rate movements. Since 
the mid-1990s, world trade in services has 
expanded much more rapidly than world trade in 
goods. However, graph 32 shows that 
developments in the euro-area’s share in world 
exports of services in value have mirrored 
developments in the share in world exports of 
goods in the past few years, suggesting that the 
changes in the shares are driven by similar factors 
in the two sectors.  
The impact of trade specialisation on euro-
area export performance 
Constant market share analysis (CMS) can be 
used to calculate the incidence of a country’s 
sectoral and geographical specialisation on its 
export performance (see Box 2 for more details 
on the methodology and data used). Using 
detailed export data broken down by sectors and 
geographical destinations, a CMS decomposition 
has been applied to the euro area (excluding 
intra-area trade), the USA and Japan. The results 
of the analysis are presented in Table 6. For each 
of the three countries/areas, the table displays a 
measure of the overall export performance and 
its decomposition into three effects. The overall 
performance is calculated as the difference 
between the country/area’s export growth and 
the export growth of a benchmark group of 33 
(mostly industrialised) exporting countries. Based 
on the CMS analysis, this total export 
performance is the sum of three effects: a pure 
market share effect (the export performance 
attributable to gains or losses in market shares on 
all individual markets19), an initial structure effect 
(the impact of the product and geographical 
specialisation observed at the beginning of the 
period of interest) and an adaptation effect 
(which captures the degree to which gains in 
market shares have been achieved on fast-
growing markets). 
An important caveat is necessary when 
interpreting the results of the table: in the 
absence of adequate price indices at sectoral 
level, the analysis was applied to value data and  
                                                     
19  An individual market is defined by a combination of a 
specific sector and a specific geographical destination. 
Table 6: Impact of specialisation on export 
performance (1) (in %) 
 Euro Area USA Japan
1994-2002    
Total export perform. 3.9 -14.2 -44.7
of which: 
  Pure market share 
 
2.6 
 
-12.1 
- 
42.1
  Initial structure 4.0 -4.5 -2.4
  Adaptation -2.8 2.4 -0.1
1998-2002   
Total export perform. -0.8 -13.7 -7.9
of which: 
  Pure market share  
 
1.3 
 
-10.4 
 
-11.7
  Initial structure 0.9 -4.8 4.0
  Adaptation -3.0 1.6 -0.1
(1) Export performance is measured by the difference between 
export growth in the country considered and export growth in a 
benchmark group of 33 countries. Export growth is in value.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
results may therefore be distorted by price 
changes and exchange rate swings. Bearing this 
limitation in mind, four insights emerge from the 
analysis. 
First, the mechanical effect of a country’s 
product and geographical specialisation may have 
a substantial impact on its export performance. 
In the case of the euro area, about one third of 
the relative export growth over the 1994-2002 
period can be explained by overall specialisation 
effects (as measured by the sum of the initial 
structure and the adaptation effects). For the 
shorter 1998-2002 period, specialisation effects 
even dominate pure market share effects.  
Second, and not very surprisingly, the impact of 
trade specialisation may vary significantly 
depending on the period considered. This is due 
both to the fact that countries’ specialisation may 
change over time and to the fact that a specific 
specialisation may be supportive in some periods 
and less supportive in others as sectoral and 
geographical sources of world trade growth 
fluctuate over time.  
Third, the overall trade specialisation of the euro 
area does not appear unfavourable. Over the 
1994-2002 period, structural effects have boosted 
the euro-area’s export performance. The effects 
are negative when considering a shorter period 
(1998-2002) but less so than in the case of the 
USA. In recent years, the euro area has benefited 
from relatively strong specialisation in sectors 
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Box 2: Constant market share analysis – an application to the euro-area export performance 
 
1. The constant market share analysis  
A country’s export performance may be explained both by competitiveness developments and by a more or less 
supportive export structure. For a similar level of price competitiveness, a country exporting predominantly towards 
fast-growing markets will enjoy a stronger growth momentum than a country with a less favourable export structure. 
A large number of empirical studies have applied constant market share (CMS) analysis to try to disentangle pure 
competitiveness factors from structural factors. CMS analysis covers a set of accounting methods which decompose 
export growth into a pure market share effect and various forms of specialisation effects. There is no single formula 
to achieve such a breakdown. The decomposition applied in this Focus section is based on the (relatively standard) 
equation:  
(1) ∆π = ∑ij αij × ∆πij + ∑ij πij × ∆αij + ∑ij ∆πij × ∆αij  
Where: 
∆: change between period 0 and period t;  
Xij : exports of the country considered for product i and geographical destination j; 
X : total exports of the country considered; 
XWij : world exports for product i and geographical destination j; 
XW: total world exports; 
πij = Xij / XWij = share of the country considered in world exports for product i and geographical destination j; 
αij = XWij / XW = share of world exports for product i and geographical destination j in total world exports. 
In equation (1), the total change in the share of the country of interest in total world exports (i.e. its market share) is 
decomposed into three effects:  
¾ a pure market share effect, which is the sum of the gains and losses in market shares on individual markets 
weighted by the structure of world exports, 
¾ the impact of the country’s initial export structure, which is the sum of the changes in the structure of world 
trade weighted by the country’s initial market shares, 
¾ an adaptation effect, which is positive if the country is gaining market shares on fast-growing world markets.  
Two methodological points should be stressed. First, direct comparisons of changes in market shares across 
countries are complicated by the existence of a scale effect: for the same export growth a bigger country will post a 
bigger change in its market share in absolute value than a smaller country. To facilitate cross-country comparisons of 
export performance, equation (1) has been transformed so as to analyse the relative export growth of the country 
considered (i.e. the difference between its export growth and world export growth) rather than the change in its 
market share. The principle of decomposition into a pure market share, an initial structure and an adaptation effect 
remains, however, the same. Second, individual markets in equation (1) are defined by the combination of a product 
and a geographical destination. Unfortunately, the respective contributions of the sectoral and geographical 
dimensions are difficult to disentangle. The initial structure and adaptation effects can each be further decomposed 
into a sectoral (or product) and a geographical sub-effect. Nevertheless, a well-known result of the literature on the 
issue is that the sectoral and geographical dimension cannot be treated symmetrically. Their respective shares in the 
initial structure and the adaptation effects therefore depend, to some extent, on the formula chosen. To reach more 
solid conclusions regarding the geographical and sectoral dimensions in this study, the results provided by two 
alternative formulae were compared.  
2. Analysing aggregate (extra)-euro-area exports  
The CMS analysis was applied to exports of goods from the euro area as a whole (excluding intra-area trade) as well 
as from the USA and Japan (see Table 6). Export data were taken from the Annual International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics compiled by the OECD. The database provides annual trade data in value at SITC3 level for 
all destinations. The most recent data are available up to 2002. Reporting countries include the 30 OECD countries 
plus China, Hong Kong China and Chinese Taipei. Altogether, these counties make up about 80% of world exports 
if intra-euro-area trade is included.  
Given that the 33 reporting countries do not add up to world trade, results derived from the CMS analysis based on 
equation (1) should be reinterpreted as a decomposition of the export performance of the country considered 
relative to the average of the 33 countries rather than an outright market share decomposition. 
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A major limitation of the OECD dataset is that it only provides data in value and in physical quantities. Given that 
aggregating tonnes of computers and vegetables does not make much sense, only value data were used in this part of 
the CMS analysis. Therefore, results should be considered with prudence insofar as changes in relative export 
performance may reflect changes in underlying volumes as well as fluctuations in prices and exchange rates.  
3. Analysing euro-area Member States’ exports performance 
 
To analyse intra-euro-area differences in export performance, the CMS analysis was also applied to individual euro-
area Member States (11 reporting countries with Belgium and Luxembourg considered as a single entity - see 
Table 7). Goods trade data from Eurostat were used for that purpose. The major advantage of Eurostat data is that 
they include price indices which allow (under certain assumptions) trade to be calculated in constant prices by sectors 
and destinations. Their major drawback is that only EU countries are available as reporting countries. The CMS 
calculations were therefore applied to Member States’ relative share in total euro-area exports rather than to standard 
market shares. As a result, the analysis provides, for each Member State, a decomposition of the export performance 
relative to the euro-area average rather than the entire world, as is generally the case for most CMS analyses (or 
relative to industrialised countries, as above).  
such as pharmaceuticals and the automotive 
industry, which have performed comparatively 
well in world trade. It has also benefited from the 
importance of its exports to fast-growing Eastern 
European countries. In contrast, comparatively 
weak specialisation in high-tech industries and 
relatively low export orientation to the most 
dynamic Asian economies dampened the euro-
area’s trade performance in the late 1990s. 
Finally, although geographical and sectoral 
dimensions are somewhat difficult to disentangle 
theoretically in CMS analysis (see Box 3), there is 
some evidence that both effects matter. In the 
case of the euro area, the impact of geographical 
specialisation has generally proved to be 
somewhat bigger over the past decade than the 
impact of sectoral specialisation, but the latter 
remains far from negligible. In contrast, there is 
no clear domination of geographical effects in 
the USA and Japan. Overall, these results suggest 
that the standard macroeconomic analyses of 
trade performance that rely exclusively on the 
geographical dimension may significantly 
underestimate specialisation effects. 
3. Trends at Member State level  
Large differences in Member States’ export 
performance 
The overall euro-area export performance 
presented in the previous section masks 
significant country differences. Looking, for 
instance, at the past three years, Member States 
such as Germany, Austria and Portugal have 
enjoyed export growth that has been well above 
average, while others, such as Italy, Greece, and 
France have recorded much weaker performance 
comparatively (Graph 33).  
Graph 33: Exports of goods and services,(1)  
(average annual growth in % – constant prices – 2002-04) 
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(1) National accounts data – including intra-EU12 trade. 
Source: Commission services. 
For data availability reasons, many empirical 
analyses of trade tend to focus on exports of 
goods while neglecting trade in services. It is, 
however, necessary to bear in mind that this 
choice may lead to a distorted picture when 
comparing Member States’ export performance. 
Large differences between growth in goods and 
services can be observed in some countries. 
Hence, the recent export performance of Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece is significantly weaker when 
only goods are considered. The opposite holds 
true for Spain and Austria. 
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Developments in price competitiveness play 
a key role in explaining export growth 
differences 
Differences in price and cost competitiveness are 
the most obvious explanation for the large 
disparity in export performance across Member 
States observed in recent years. The explanation 
is supported by the data. Graph 34 displays the 
average changes in the real effective exchange 
rate based on the export price deflator and the 
average changes in real exports of goods and 
services for the 2002-04 period for all  euro-area 
Member States (excluding Luxembourg).  
Graph 34: Export growth and competitiveness  
 (average annual growth in % – const. prices– 2002-04) 
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(1) Export growth is based on national accounts data and includes 
goods and services as well as intra-EU12 trade.  
(2) The REER is based on the export price deflator. 
Source: Commission services. 
The graph suggests a close link between the two 
variables with developments in competitiveness 
accounting for more than 40% of the observed 
variance in national export growth rates.20 The 
correlation is robust in the sense that extending 
the period does not alter it significantly. 
Nevertheless, with close to 60% of the dispersion 
of Member States’ export performance remaining 
unexplained, differences in competitiveness can 
only be one of the determinants of the 
differences in export growth across Member 
States.  
                                                     
20 The correlation between intra-area competitiveness and 
intra-area trade is weaker than as regards the extra and 
overall euro area dimension. 
But differences in geographical 
specialisation also matter… 
A source of disparities in export performance is 
related to differences in Member States’ 
geographical export specialisation. This is shown 
in Graph 35, which is constructed in a similar 
way to Graph 34, except that the vertical axis 
measures countries’ relative export performance, 
taking into account the geographical dimension. 
For each Member State, export performance is 
measured as the change in the ratio of real 
exports of goods and services to a weighted sum 
of import demand in industrialised countries. 
The weight system is country-specific, reflecting 
the importance of each geographical destination 
in that country’s total exports. The measure of 
export performance therefore takes into account 
that some Member States may benefit from 
stronger specialisation in the most dynamic 
geographical export markets.   
Graph 35: Export performance and competitiveness – 
adjusting for geographical specialisation (1) (2002-04) 
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(1) Export performance is measured as the change in the ratio of 
real exports (goods and services) to a weighted sum of import 
demand in industrialised countries. The weights reflect the country’s 
geographical export structure.  
(2) The REER is based on the export price deflator. 
Source: Commission services. 
The correlation between price competitiveness 
and this measure of export performance is 
somewhat higher than in the case of Graph 34, 
suggesting that differences in geographical 
specialisation can help explain some of the 
variance in export growth across Member States. 
However, the outliers in Graph 34 remain 
outliers in Graph 35, indicating that the 
geographical dimension is only part of the story.  
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… and the sectoral dimension should not be 
ignored 
Due to a lack of detailed and up-to-date sectoral 
national accounts data, the sectoral dimension is 
generally ignored in macroeconomic analysis. 
However, to the extent that some Member States 
may have benefited from more growth-
supportive sectoral specialisation than others, 
this dimension may have played an important 
role in accounting for disparities in export 
performance in recent years.  
To assess the respective importance of sectoral 
and geographical specialisation effects, a CMS 
decomposition has been applied to the exports of 
each individual euro-area Member State. To 
circumvent the interpretation difficulties inherent 
in the analysis of market shares in value, the 
dataset has been restricted to euro-area goods 
export data for which volume data can be 
estimated (see also Box 2).21 In this setting, the 
export performance of each individual country is 
assessed relative to the euro-area average rather 
than to a broader group (e.g. the industrialised 
countries benchmark used in Graph 35).  
Table 7 presents the results of the CMS analysis 
for the 2000-03 period.22 For lack of space, the 
table aggregates the initial structure and 
adaptation effects into a single specialisation 
effect. However, it provides a breakdown of this 
specialisation effect into a geographical and a 
sectoral component (last two columns of the 
table). The decomposition shows that neglecting 
the sectoral dimension may lead to a serious 
distortion of the export performance picture. For 
most Member States the sectoral effects 
dominated the geographical effects over the 
period considered. Ireland is the most extreme 
example of the importance of the sectoral 
dimension. Once sectoral effects are taken into 
account, the Irish export performance appears 
quite weak relative to the euro-area average for 
                                                     
21  Eurostat collects export data by product and geographical 
destination and some price indices for all Member States 
but not for non-EU countries. In the absence of detailed 
export volume data for a broader group of countries, 
individual Member States’ export performance could only 
be assessed against the euro area average.  
22  Detailed sectoral-geographical trade data are only 
available up to 2003.  
the 2000-03 period. This is shown by a large 
negative pure market share effect (second 
column in the table). Large negative sectoral 
specialisation effects were registered in Finland, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece and Italy for 
that period. 
Table 7: Impact of specialisation on the export 
growth of goods between 2000 and 2003 (in %) 
 Total 
relative 
Pure 
market 
Specialisation effects 
(2) 
 export 
growth(1) 
share 
effect 
Sectoral Geograph. 
BELU 6.8 5.1 3.8 -2.0
DE 3.9 2.3 0.5 1.1
EL -10.0 -11.9 -2.8 4.7
ES 4.4 6.8 0.2 -2.6
FR -9.5 -9.5 -0.5 0.5
IE 0.0 -11.3 13.1 -1.8
IT -7.3 -5.0 -2.6 0.3
NL 2.1 6.7 -3.5 -1.1
AT 11.7 12.3 -1.6 0.9
PT 1.8 4.8 -3.0 -0.1
FI -6.3 -4.4 -4.6 2.7
(1) Total relative export growth is measured by the difference 
between export growth in the country considered and export 
growth in the euro area as a whole. Exports are in constant prices.  
(2) Specialisation in the sum of the initial structure and adaptation 
effects.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Another reason for taking the sectoral dimension 
seriously is related to the measurement of price 
and cost competitiveness. The assessment of 
competitiveness may be seriously hampered by 
measurement issues in smaller Member States 
with strong sectoral specialisation. As discussed 
further in Box 3, standard macroeconomic 
measures of the real effective exchange rate may 
overestimate (underestimate) gains in 
competitiveness for those countries where the 
export industry is heavily specialised in fast 
(slow)-growing sectors. For instance, gains in 
competitiveness in Ireland in the late 1990s 
appear much less remarkable when corrected for 
the fact that the Irish export structure is skewed 
towards high-tech sectors where prices are falling 
rapidly. In that case, comparing average Irish 
export prices to the average prices of a basket of 
countries which are generally far less specialised 
in high-tech industries is quite misleading.  
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 33 - 
Box 3: Measuring competitiveness - the sectoral dimension 
 
As described in the December issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, the most common indicators to 
measure international competitiveness are real effective exchange rates (REERs) based on relative unit labour costs, 
relative consumer prices or relative export prices. A prominent shortcoming of these measures is that they do not 
take into account possible country differences in sectoral specialisation. For countries with export specialisation quite 
different from others, aggregate measures of the REER may not properly reflect true changes in competitiveness. 
Let’s assume, for instance, that a country is more heavily specialised in ICT products than its competitors. Since the 
late 1990s, ICT production has generally been associated with fast productivity gains and falling labour costs and 
producer prices. In such a case, the traditional (aggregate) macroeconomic measures of the REER will tend to show 
gains in competitiveness in the ICT-intensive country as aggregate price and costs evolve more favourably in that 
country (thanks to a comparatively bigger ICT weight). However, it is easy to imagine a situation where the gains 
might be due to a purely sectoral bias and where the ICT-intensive country might in fact be losing competitiveness in 
all its main exporting sectors. 
To further illustrate the sectoral influence on competitiveness measures, a new measure of the REER has been 
constructed. For a country X, “specialised” relative unit labour costs have been constructed by re-weighting the 
sectoral unit labour costs of all its trading partners according to the sector’s weights in the exports of country X. The 
aggregate of these sectoral unit labour costs has then been used to calculate real effective exchange rates corrected 
for any possible sectoral bias. The sectoral data for exports and unit labour costs were taken from the OECD’s 
STAN (STructural ANalysis) indicators database. Due to data limitations the standard reference group of 34 
countries had to be reduced to 13 countries (United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium/Luxemburg, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). In addition, for the extent of the sectoral 
bias to be assessed, “benchmark” real effective exchange rates have been calculated for the same 13 reference 
countries and standard macroeconomic unit labour costs data for the economy as whole. Except for a smaller 
country basket, these benchmark indicators are the same as those routinely calculated at DG ECFIN. Due to data 
limitations both the sectorally corrected and benchmark REERs have been calculated for the period 1990 to 2001. 
For both measures, the same methodology as described in DG ECFIN’s quarterly report on price and cost 
competitiveness has been applied. (see  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetitiveness_en.htm ) 
Real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
For Ireland, the finding is that gains in competitiveness over the past decade look much less impressive if sectoral 
effects are taken into account. Indeed, the real effective exchange rate corrected for sectoral bias suggests that gains 
in competitiveness were fairly limited between 1995 and 2000 and were negative in 2001. In the case of Spain, the 
sectoral approach only leads to different results in 2000 and 2001, when the benchmark REER shows weaker 
appreciation than the sectorally adjusted measure. In other words, Spanish competitiveness may have deteriorated 
more significantly since 2000 than has generally been thought when looking at traditional macroeconomic REERs. 
However, with data only available up to 2001, such a conclusion should be considered with prudence. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that sectorally adjusted REERs have also been calculated for the Netherlands and Finland. In the 
case of the Netherlands, correcting for sectoral bias does not make any substantial difference, suggesting that 
standard macroeconomic indicators can be used reliably in that country. More prudence is required in the case of 
Finland where the sectorally corrected REER shows better competitiveness developments in 2000-01 than the 
benchmark.  
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On the role of temporary asymmetric shocks  
It is interesting to note that, despite the 
persistence of large differences, Member States’ 
export performance has shown some 
convergence in the past few years. Graph 36 
shows a strikingly close relation between the 
strength of export growth in the late 1990s and 
the ensuing export slowdown. Member States 
with above-average export growth in the late 
1990s experienced a sharper export slowdown 
during the 2001-04 period than others.  
Graph 36: The correction to the export divergence of  
the late 1990s (average annual growth in %) 
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(1) Difference in the average growth of exports of goods and 
services between the 1997-00 and 2001-04 periods 
Source: Commission services. 
Such a pattern reflects, in part, a 
competitiveness-related correction mechanism. 
Countries which enjoyed comparatively fast 
(slow)-growing exports in the late 1990s also 
experienced faster (slower) overall growth, 
stronger (weaker) price tensions and bigger 
(smaller) losses in competitiveness in the early 
2000s. However, although this mechanism has 
been in operation in some countries (leading for 
instance to a deterioration of price 
competitiveness in Ireland, Greece and Spain), its 
overall explanatory power remains relatively 
limited. The correlation across Member States 
between the strength of export growth in the late 
1990s and the ensuing increases in the real 
exchange rate is relatively small. This indicates 
that additional, more powerful, correction factors 
must also have been at play. A possible 
explanation is that one or several asymmetric 
shocks contributed to widening disparities in 
Member States’ export performance in the late 
1990s. The reversal of these shocks after 2000 
was a factor of cyclical convergence within the 
euro area in the early 2000s. 
This interpretation is backed by the results of the 
CMS analysis. Running CMS decompositions 
over several periods of time shows that the 
importance and the signs of specialisation effects 
are not stable over time. Some Member States, 
which had benefited from positive specialisation 
effects in the late 1990s, experienced an (at least 
partial) reversal of these gains between 2000 and 
2003 (e.g. Ireland, Finland and France). Other 
countries, which had suffered from negative or 
weak specialisation effects in the late 1990s, 
subsequently reported a noticeable improvement 
on account of these structural effects (Austria, 
Belgium and Italy). The strong link between the 
changes in specialisation effects and the change 
in export growth between the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s is shown in Graph 37.23 
Graph 37: Importance of specialisation effects in 
explaining differences in export slowdown  
(growth in %) 
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(1) Difference in the average growth of exports of goods and 
services between the 1998-00 and 2001-03 periods. 
(2) Change in specialisation effects between 1998-00 and 2001-03. 
Specialisation is measured as the sum of the initial structure and 
adaptation effects in the CMS analysis.  
Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
23  The graph excludes a major outlier, namely Greece which 
has experienced large losses in markets shares in recent 
years despite a specialisation structure that has become 
much more supportive than in the past. These 
developments point to a serious competitiveness problem 
in that country. 
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The geographical and sectoral breakdown of 
CMS analysis also sheds further light on the 
nature of these asymmetric shocks. To some 
extent, changes in specialisation effect between 
the late 1990s and early 2000s can be related to 
geographical factors, probably reflecting the 
emergence of Eastern Europe as a major trade 
partner. Nevertheless, the changes in 
specialisation were clearly dominated by sectoral 
effects, particularly in countries such as Ireland, 
Finland and the Netherlands, indicating a 
possible important role of the ICT industries. 
Overall, the asymmetric shocks of the late 1990s 
were clearly more of a sectoral than of a 
geographical nature. 
A closer look at the largest Member States  
Recent developments in export growth in some 
of the largest euro-area countries appear difficult 
to explain. Hence, both Germany and Spain have 
experienced a comparatively sustained export 
performance despite mediocre real exchange rate 
developments over the past few years (at least 
when measured on the basis of export prices). In 
contrast, France has experienced comparatively 
weak export growth without tangible signs of 
losses in price competitiveness. The sectoral and 
geographical specialisation effects in Table 7 
offer only limited help to explain these 
differences. However, an analysis of the sectoral 
and geographical details of the pure market share 
gains (second column in Table 7) can be used to 
find some kind of explanation.  
Table 8 : REER and export performance, selected 
Member States (2002-2004) 
 Change in REER (1) 
Change in export 
performance (2) 
Germany 2.5  0.3 
Spain 2.7 -0.7 
France 2.0 -3.0 
Italy 4.7 -5.2 
(1) Based on export prices. 
(2) See Graph 35 for a definition of the concept of export 
performance. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Germany. Two factors seem to be important when 
assessing the robustness of the recent export 
performance of the German economy. First, 
most of the recent gains in market shares by 
German exporters are concentrated in a few, 
essentially high-tech, sectors including office 
machinery, telecom equipment and electrical 
machinery and automotive vehicles. This 
suggests that a number of industry-specific 
factors (which would warrant closer research) 
have been driving the good German export 
performance.  
Second, the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate based on export price in the past few years 
masks much more favourable developments in 
terms of unit labour costs. German exporters 
have taken advantage of favourable cost 
developments to rebuild margins, giving them 
some leeway to cut prices if necessary. Overall, 
therefore, the recent strong export performance 
of the German economy seems robust.  
Spain. The situation of Spain appears quite 
different. First, the deterioration in price 
competitiveness in the past few years has been 
paralleled by an even larger deterioration of 
labour costs, and exporters have had to cut their 
margins. Second, there is some evidence that 
Spanish exports have been essentially boosted by 
a catching-up process in terms of integration in 
the world economy. Several arguments support 
this interpretation. The trade openness of Spain, 
as measured by the share of trade in GDP, 
remains relatively low for a medium-sized 
country. Furthermore, gains in market shares in 
recent years have been achieved with no 
improvement to the trade balance. Finally, gains 
in market shares have also been fairly broad-
based covering a large number of sectors and 
destinations.24 Overall, recent gains in market 
shares by Spanish exporters should not be 
interpreted as a sign that the losses in cost 
competitiveness experienced in the past few 
years have been harmless.  
France. Recent losses in market shares since 2000 
are broad-based both in geographical and in 
sectoral terms. However, significant losses were 
registered precisely in the sectors where 
neighbouring countries such as Germany and, to 
a lesser degree, Spain fared particularly well. In 
                                                     
24  Although there is evidence that Spanish exports have 
particularly benefited from inflows of FDI in the 
transport sector and the associated build-up of an export-
oriented production base in that sector.   
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addition, it is worth mentioning that losses in 
market shares by French exporters are not a 
recent phenomenon. Significant losses were 
already registered in the late 1990s but were 
masked at the time by relatively strong positive 
sectoral specialisation effects.  
Italy. In contrast with the three countries analysed 
briefly above, recent developments in Italian 
exports are easier to explain. In the past few 
years, the country has experienced the largest real 
exchange rate appreciation in the euro area, 
whether measured in export prices or unit labour 
costs. These adverse cost competitiveness 
developments have led to significant losses in 
“pure market shares” (Table 7). In addition, but 
to a lower degree, Italian export growth has also 
been hampered by an unfavourable export 
specialisation.  
The competitiveness adjustment mechanism 
revisited  
The special interest in Member States’ export 
performance is motivated by the key role of 
external price competitiveness as a correction 
mechanism to cyclical differences within the euro 
area. In the absence of independent monetary 
and exchange rate policies, differences in 
competitiveness become a central adjustment 
process in an economic and monetary union. For 
instance, a country enjoying better cyclical 
conditions than the euro-area average is also 
likely to experience stronger inflationary 
pressures and a deterioration of its 
competitiveness relative to other Member States. 
This competitiveness channel should help 
assuage cyclical differences within the euro area25.  
As already highlighted, competitiveness effects 
can help explain differences in Member States’ 
export growth in recent years. However, their 
contribution to cyclical convergence in the euro 
area has been relatively limited in the past few 
years. As shown in Graph 38, there is a positive 
link (as predicted by economic theory) between 
Member States’ relative cyclical positions at the 
                                                     
25 See  Deroose S., Langedijk S., and Roeger W., “Reviewing 
adjustment dynamics in EMU, from overheating to 
overcooling”, European Commission, Economic Papers, 
No. 198, January 2004. 
peak of the cycle in 2000 and subsequent changes 
in the real effective exchange rate when 
measured in terms of unit labour costs. However, 
the link is only weak.26 Some Member States with 
comparatively large positive output gaps in the 
late 1990s have managed to contain labour cost 
pressures (e.g. Finland) whereas other Member 
States with comparatively lower cyclical pressures 
have registered large losses in competitiveness in 
the last few years (e.g. Spain and Italy). Overall, 
adjustment to cyclical differences is only one of 
the factors explaining Member States’ differences 
in labour cost and competitiveness within the 
euro area. For instance, changes in the bargaining 
process or difficulties in adjusting to changes in 
trend productivity may lead to labour cost 
slippages and loss in competitiveness even in the 
absence of clear economic overheating. 
Graph 38: Cyclical divergence and changes in the 
REER based on ULC (in %) 
 BE 
 DE 
 EL 
 ES 
 FR 
 IE  IT 
  NL 
 AT 
  PT 
  FI 
R2 = 0.18
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Output gap in 2000 as a share of GDP
Ch
an
ge
s i
n t
he
 R
EE
R 
ba
se
d o
n U
LC
 
20
01
-04
 (1
)
 
(1) Average annual change. 
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Another factor that may dampen the 
effectiveness of the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism is exporters’ margin behaviour. If 
improvements in competitiveness due to 
favourable developments in labour costs are first 
used to restore depressed profit margins, their 
impact on export performance may be mitigated 
and lag significantly. Hence, replacing real 
exchange rates based on labour costs (as in 
Graph 38) by real exchange rates based on 
export prices (as in Graph 39) turns the positive 
                                                     
26  The correlation actually falls to around 0 if Ireland is 
excluded. 
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relation between the output gap and the REER 
into a negative one. This indicates that the last 
few years have seen large differences in margin 
behaviour across Member States. Since 2001, 
exporters in all Member States have responded to 
the appreciation of the euro by cutting their 
margins (as measured by the change in the ratio 
of export prices to unit labour costs). However, 
in some countries developments in costs have 
been sufficiently favourable to allow exporters to 
limit their losses in profitability (Germany and 
Austria) while in others the squeeze in profit 
margins has been quite substantial (Ireland, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain and, to a lesser 
degree, Finland)27.  
Graph 39: Cyclical divergence and changes in the 
REER based on export prices (in %) 
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27 A more in-depth analysis of growth differences between 
Member States will be presented in a forthcoming June 
2005 issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. 
Finally, the analysis presented in this Focus 
section suggests that some caution is necessary 
when trying to assess the importance of the 
competitiveness adjustment mechanism within 
the euro area. Although the mechanism has been 
at play in the past few years, the picture has been 
blurred by several factors.  
¾ First, sectoral and geographical specialisation 
effects may have a strong and possibly 
fluctuating impact on Member States’ export 
growth. Hence, asymmetric trade shocks or 
the asymmetric transmission of common 
trade shocks have partly concealed the effect 
of the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
¾ Second, differences in exposure to extra-area 
trade have entailed asymmetries in the 
transmission of the fluctuations in the euro 
exchange rate. All other things being equal, 
countries with a higher share of extra-area 
exports in total exports have also lost more 
competitiveness than others in the past few 
years.  
¾ Finally, Competitiveness developments may 
not always be accurately captured by 
traditional macroeconomic measures of the 
real effective exchange rates, especially in the 
case of small countries with strong sectoral 
specialisation. For instance, traditional REER 
measures ignoring this sectoral dimension 
tend to underestimate the extent of the losses 
in competitiveness incurred by Irish exporters 
in the past few years. Hence, the 
competitiveness adjustment mechanism has 
probably been more at play in this country 
than is suggested in Graph 39. 
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1. Policy documents 
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EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.15. February 2005 
Improving the Stability and Growth Pact: the Commission’s three pillar approach  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers15_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.16. March 2005 
The economic costs of non-Lisbon. A survey of the literature on the economic impact of Lisbon-type 
reforms 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers16_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.17. April 2005 
10 Years of Barcelona process: taking stock of economic progress in EU Mediterranean partners  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers17_en.htm 
Communication by the Commission on "Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact" (COM(2004)581) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/sgp/com2004581_en.htm 
Communication by the Commission on "The situation of Germany and France in relation to their 
obligations under the excessive deficit procedure following the judgement of the Court of Justice" 
(COM(2004)813) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp/com_com_2004_en.pdf 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 216.  
Alfonso Arpaia and Giuseppe Carone 
Do labour taxes (and their composition) affect wages in the short and the long run? 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers216_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 217.  
Andrea Montanino, Bartosz Przywara and David Young (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs)    
Investment in education: the implications for economic growth and public finances 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers217_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 218.  
Gaëtan Nicodème (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and  Jacques-Bernard Sauner-Leroy 
(Banque de France) 
Product market reforms and productivity: a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
transmission channels  
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 39 - 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers218_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 219.  
Daniel Grenouilleau (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
A sorted leading indicators dynamic (SLID) factor model for short-run euro-area GDP forecasting 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers219_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 220.  
Marco Ratto, Werner Röger, Jan in’t Veld and Riccardo Girardi (Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs)  
An estimated new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro area 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers220_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 221.  
C. Denis, K. Mc Morrow, W. Röger and R. Veugelers (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs)  
The Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s structural productivity problem 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers221_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 222.  
Michele Cincera (DULBEA-CERT, ULB and CEPR) and Olivia Galgau (DULBEA, ULB) 
Impact of market entry and exit on EU productivity and growth performance 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers222_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 223.  
Elena Flores, Gabriele Giudice and Alessandro Turrini (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial) 
The framework for fiscal policy in EMU: What future after five years of experience? 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers223_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 224.  
Lars Jonung (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Thomas Hagberg 
(Ekonomistyrningsverket, Stockholm)  
How costly was the crisis of the 1990s? A comparative analysis of the deepest crises in Finland and Sweden 
over the last 130 years. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers224_en.htm  
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -11 -3 -3 -4 -5 -6 -8 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.5 0.5   
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.4 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2  
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -18 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -14 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3  
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.5 
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2 80.7 80.9 80.5 80.6 81.4 81.7 82.0 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -2.7 -0.4 1.1 -0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.7  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.9  
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8 2.5 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2  
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8  
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22 -24 -10 -11 -12 -10 -12 -15 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 121 125 132 149 151 152    
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 1038.6 96.1 97.6 97.1 97.8   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 970.4 93.2 94.2 92.6 94.3   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 68.2 2.9 3.4 4.5 3.5   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 3.4 1.7 0.2 0.1 1.4 2.7 1.3 0.5  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 2.1 1.7 0.4 2.4 3.1 1.0  
   2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 2.0 44.9 18.1 1.4 1.7 2.8 3.2   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -11.0 -18.4 -9.7 0.1 7.3 -13.1   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 64.4 -9.4 5.9 -10.5 37.1 -18.2   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.6  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7 1.6 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.2  
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 102.2 102.4 102.5       
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053 2420 2794 2883 2926 2957 3050 3066 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6 7.8 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.5   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7 5.0 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.2  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.25 1.31 1.34 1.31 1.30 1.32 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.4 110.8 112.2 113.7 112.5 111.6 112.5 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.3 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.4 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.5 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.6 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.8 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.9 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2005 
 
 
 
- 42 - 
 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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